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Introduction
The worldwide financial crisis, which broke out in August 2007, triggered severe turbulence in the euro area money markets. Particularly in the aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, several previously unseen developments could be observed. Transactions in the interbank markets fell dramatically and the interest rate for overnight interbank lending, which is usually slightly above the Eurosystem's 1 key policy rate, declined significantly below this rate. At the same time, aggregate borrowing of euro area commercial banks from the Eurosystem but also their use of the Eurosystem's deposit facility rose sharply.
In this paper, we present a theoretical model which can explain these developments.
Using our model results, we state that transaction costs in the interbank market played a crucial role. We argue that during the financial crisis, transaction costs in the interbank market increased significantly. The reason is that the financial crisis implied high bank asset losses, and that there was a high degree of uncertainty in how far individual banks were affected, and therefore also, about the soundness of potential transaction partners in the interbank market. Consequently, it became much more difficult to find suitable counterparties in that market. Deficit banks with a liquidity shortage reacted to this by expanding borrowing from the central bank as the transaction costs made the interbank market as a funding source too expensive. This expansion led to excess liquidity in the banking sector which put downward pressure on the interbank market rate and induced several surplus banks to deposit their excess liquidity in the ECB's deposit facility. We thus challenge the view put forward e.g. by Trichet (2009a) that the intensified use of the deposit facility during the financial crisis indicates that banks in the euro area held excess reserves for precautionary motives. Instead, our argument is that as a consequence of strongly increased transaction costs, the ECB replaced the interbank market by assuming an intermediary function between surplus and deficit banks. 2 When drawing the policy implications from our model, it is important to distinguish between measures from the monetary policy perspective and from the liquidity manage-ment perspective. Crucial from the monetary policy perspective is determining the optimal interest rate level required to maintain price stability in the euro area. Crucial from the liquidity management perspective is to ensure that the transmission mechanism, i.e. the process through which interest rate decisions by the Eurosystem affect the price level and possibly the real economy, works properly and that during a financial crisis liquidity problems do not turn into solvency problems (González-Páramo, 2009) . In this paper, we focus on the Eurosystem's liquidity management during the crisis which consisted of a couple of non-standard-measures comprising the following five building blocks. 3 (1) The Eurosystem fully satisfied the banks' demand for liquidity. (2) The list of assets eligible for use as collateral for credit operations with the Eurosystem was expanded. (3) The range of maturities of the longer-term refinancing operations was expanded up to one year. (4) The Eurosystem provided liquidity to the banking sector in the euro area in foreign currencies.
(5) The Eurosystem started to purchase euro-denominated covered bonds. According to our model a key feature of the Eurosystem's liquidity management after the collapse of Lehman Brothers is that it assumed an intermediary function between banks. The obvious way to reverse this function and to reactivate interbank market transactions is to reduce transaction costs in the interbank market. However, this cannot be accomplished by the Eurosystem since it can not reduce informational problems and uncertainties about the soundness of financial institutions. What the Eurosystem could do to reduce its intermediary activities is to make borrowing from and placing liquidity at the central bank less attractive. However, this would imply an increase in the credit institutions' costs which conflicts with its aim from a monetary policy and financial stability perspective. What the Eurosystem can do to support the revitalization of the interbank market is to make transactions with the central bank less attractive gradually over time, as informational problems and uncertainties become less and less significant.
The related literature on the liquidity management of credit institutions, central bank activities and the consequences for the interbank market can be divided into three groups.
The first group focusses on the liquidity management of U.S. banks and the U.S. federal funds market before the financial crisis. 4 The second group concentrates on the banks' and central bank's behaviour and the interbank market in the euro area before the financial crisis. 5 Our paper belongs to the third group, which analyzes specific aspects of the credit institutions' and central banks' liquidity management during the financial crisis which started in August 2007. Allen, Carletti, and Gale (2009) discuss central bank measures to reduce the volatility of the interbank market rate. Eisenschmidt and Tapking (2009) analyze the evolution of liquidity risk premia in unsecured interbank markets. Bruche and Suarez (2010) and Heider, Hoerova, and Holthausen (2009) show that counterparty risk can lead to a decline in the transaction volume in the interbank market. While these contributions concentrate on particular aspects of the financial crisis, our paper aims at providing a simultaneous explanation for the strongly increased demand for central bank liquidity, the significant use of the deposit facility and the systematic decrease of the interbank market rate below the key policy rate in the euro area and by drawing respective policy implications. With this focus, our paper is complementary to Ashcraft, McAndrews, and Skeie (2009) who study similar aspects for the U.S. interbank market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the institutional background. Section 3 describes the stylized facts to be explained by our theoretical model which is presented in section 4. In section 5, we discuss the results and the policy implications. The last section summarizes.
Institutional Background
Deposits that banks hold on their accounts with the central bank plus the currency they physically hold are the reserves of the banking sector. In the euro area, the needs for reserves arise from minimum reserve requirements and so-called autonomous liquidity factors, as banknotes in circulation.
The banking sector's needs for these reserves can only be satisfied by the Eurosystem. It has monopoly power over the creation of reserves. This allows the Eurosystem to steer the interest rate in the interbank market for reserves which is its operating target. For steering this interest rate, the Eurosystem assesses the needs for reserves and provides or absorbs the appropriate amount of liquidity. Important instruments for providing/absorbing reserves are the main refinancing operations (MROs), the longer-term refinancing operations, the fine-tuning operations and two standing facilities. The MROs are credit operations. They have a maturity of one week and are conducted weekly as 5 See, for example, Breitung and Nautz (2001) , Ayuso and Repullo (2001, 2003) , Ewerhart (2002) , Bindseil (2002) , Oechssler (2003, 2006) , Neyer and Wiemers (2004) and Neyer (2009) .
either a fixed rate tender or a variable rate tender. For each MRO, the ECB calculates a benchmark allotment, which reflects the banking sector's liquidity needs during the maturity of the MRO, as assessed by the ECB, if the reserve requirements are fulfilled smoothly over the reserve maintenance period. 6 In "normal" times, bids will be rationed if total bids exceed the benchmark allotment. A further source of reserves for the banking sector are longer-term refinancing operations. In "normal" times they are conducted once a month and have a maturity of three months. The fine-tuning operations are non-standardized instruments to provide or absorb liquidity. Concerning the two standing facilities one has to distinguish between a credit facility and a deposit facility. Both have an overnight maturity. On the initiative of the credit institutions, the credit facility provides liquidity, whereas the deposit facility absorbs liquidity. The interest rates on these facilities usually form a symmetric corridor around the MRO-rate. All credit operations with the Eurosystem have to be based on adequate collateral. Assets eligible as collateral must fulfil certain criteria defined by the Eurosystem. 7
In the interbank market for reserves, banks exchange deposits they hold on their accounts with the Eurosystem. This market thus reallocates the reserves originally provided by the central bank. One reason for this reallocation is that usually, the shortest frequency by which the Eurosystem provides reserves to the banking sector is one week, namely through its MROs. While the needs for reserves of the banking sector as a whole may not change significantly within one week, the needs for reserves of individual banks usually fluctuate daily. These fluctuations result from cash withdrawls and cash deposits by the banks' customers and by bank transfer payments between the banks' customers.
The reason for the latter is that the Eurosystem acts as a clearing institution by operating the most important interbank payment system in the euro area which implies that payments between banks are made by exchanging deposits on their reserve accounts at the Eurosystem. Another reason why banks exchange reserves on the interbank market is 6 The definition of the benchmark allotment reveals that although a single bank may fulfil its reserve requirements unevenly over the maintenance period (for fulfilling its reserve requirements, a credit institution can make use of averaging positions over the reserve maintenance period), the Eurosystem aims on aggregate a smooth fulfilment. The reason given is this enhances the buffer function of the minimum reserve system against transitory liquidity shocks (European Central Bank, 2002, p. 47 that not all banks borrow the reserves they need directly from the central bank but prefer to cover their needs for reserves exclusively in the interbank market. Figure 1 shows that in the first phase of the financial crisis, the actual banking sector's needs for reserves resulting from reserve requirements and autonomous liquidity factors did not change significantly compared to the pre-crisis period. However, the Eurosystem changed the timing of its liquidity provisions. 9 Before the crisis, it covered the banking sector's actual liquidity needs in such a way that the banking sector fulfilled its reserve requirements smoothly over a reserve maintenance period. The two lines representing the current account holdings and the reserve requirements almost coincide. However, from 8 In the euro area, more than 1.700 banks are eligible to participate in the MROs. However, less than 500 banks actually take part in these operations (European Central Bank, 2007, p. 89) . For a respective theoretical analysis see Neyer and Wiemers (2004) . However, with the beginning of the second phase there was a strong increase in the use of the deposit facility while the use of the marginal lending facility remained rather low.
At the same time, transaction in the interbank market for reserves decreased significantly (European Central Bank, 2009a,b) . Figure 3 reveals that this decrease in interbank market activities came along with a systematic fall of the EONIA 12 below the MRO-rate. Note that usually, there is a positive spread between the interbank market rate and MRO-rate. 13
To sum up, the second phase of the financial crisis which started in September 2008, was associated with (1) a strong increase in the banking sector's demand for reserves in the Eurosystem's tender procedures, (2) a strong increase in the use of the Eurosystem's deposit facility, whereas the use of the marginal lending facility did not increase significantly, (3) a strong decrease in transactions in the interbank market for reserves, and (4) a systematic fall of the EONIA below the MRO-rate.
12 EONIA is the abbreviation for Euro Overnight Index Average. It is a market index computed as the weighted average of overnight unsecured lending transactions undertaken by a representative panel of banks. For more information on this reference rate see www.euribor.org.
13 For respective empirical analyses see, for example, Nyborg, Bindseil, and Strebulaev (2002) , Ayuso and Repullo (2003) , Ejerskov, Moss, and Stracca (2003) , Nyborg, Bindseil, and Strebulaev (2002) , and Neyer and Wiemers (2004) . For a theoretical explanation see, for example, Ayuso and Repullo (2003) and Neyer and Wiemers (2004) .
The Model

Framework
In this section, we introduce a theoretical model which can explain the just described styl- 
and obtaining funds by borrowing CF in the credit facility costs
The central bank also offers a deposit facility. A commercial bank can place liquidity DF ≥ 0 in this facility at the rate i DF so that costs of the deposit facility are
We assume that the rates on the facilities form a symmetric corridor around the MRO-rate,
with the behavior of the ECB.
Each commercial bank can lend and borrow liquidity in the interbank market. A bank's position in that market is B. If B > 0, the bank will borrow liquidity at the rate i IBM . If B < 0, the bank will lend at this rate. Trading in the interbank market involves transaction costs which are equal to 1 2 γB 2 with γ > 0. This quadratic form is a common approach of modelling transaction costs in the interbank market (see, for example, Campbell, 1987; Bartolini, Bertola, and Prati, 2001) . It reflects increasing marginal costs of searching for banks with matching liquidity needs and those resulting from the need to split large transactions into many small ones to work around credit lines. Therefore, a bank's costs in the interbank market are
There are two types j = a, b of commercial banks which differ with respect to their autonomous liquidity needs. Type a faces an autonomous liquidity deficit (A a > 0) whereas type b has an autonomous liquidity surplus (A b < 0). Half of the population is of type a while the rest is of type b. In the following, we will refer to these two types simply as bank a and bank b. The numerical example given in Table 1 exemplifies the interrelation between the banks' autonomous liquidity needs which is formally given by The sequence of moves is as follows: First, each bank chooses and receives the amount of liquidity K that it wishes to obtain in the central bank's MRO. We thus assume that the central bank fully satisfies each bid K of the banks. Then, the state of the world realizes and each bank type learns its autonomous liquidity needs A, and it chooses the amount B that it wishes to borrow or lend in the interbank market. Simultaneously, it decides whether or not to use the credit facility or the deposit facility offered by the central bank.
A bank will use the credit facility if its transaction in the interbank market implies that it is left with a liquidity shortage, i.e. if A − K − B > 0. Then, the bank will cover this deficit by borrowing from the central bank via the credit facility (
A bank will use the deposit facility if its transaction in the interbank market implies that it is left with excess liquidity, i.e. if A − K − B < 0. Then, it will place this surplus amount in the deposit facility (DF = B + K − A). Using the equations (2) and (3), we then obtain for the costs of using the facilities
Each bank aims at minimizing total liquidity costs by choosing its optimal net borrowing from the central bank and its optimal transactions in the interbank market. We solve this optimization problem backwards. First, we determine a bank's optimal behavior in the interbank market and thus its optimal use of the facilities offered by the central bank (second stage). Then, we derive a bank's optimal borrowing in the central bank's MRO (first stage).
Optimal Transactions in the Interbank Market (Second Stage)
This section concentrates on the second stage of the model. We proceed in two steps. First, we determine a bank's optimal transaction in the interbank market taking the interest rate i IBM as given. Then, we derive the equilibrium interest rate in the interbank market.
After the state of the world has been realized, a bank knows its actual liquidity needs A and has to decide whether and how much to trade in the interbank market, and thus, in how far to use the facilities offered by the central bank. 14 As the bank aims at minimizing its liquidity costs, its optimization problem is
Note that we can restrict attention to i IBM ∈ i DF ; i CF + α . If the interbank rate were smaller than i DF , no bank would be willing to supply credit as it would pay more to place excess liquidity in the deposit facility. If it were larger than i CF + α, no bank would demand credit in the interbank market. Instead, banks would use the credit facility to overcome a liquidity shortage. Solving the bank's optimization problem (6), we obtain
Lemma 1: In the interbank market, a bank
• with a liquidity gap A − K > 0 will choose:
• with excess liquidity K − A ≥ 0 will choose:
Proof: see appendix.
To interpret the Lemma, consider a bank which faces a liquidity gap A − K > 0 after the state of the world has been realized. The bank can close the gap by borrowing A − K in the interbank market. The marginal cost of this transaction, consisting of the interest payment and the transaction costs, is equal to i IBM + γ (A − K). As long as this marginal cost is (weakly) smaller than the marginal cost i CF + α of the credit facility, it does not pay to use the credit facility. Accordingly, the bank will borrow B opt = A − K in the interbank market and it will not use the credit facility. This, however, is no longer true if the marginal cost of closing the total liquidity gap through the interbank market exceeds the marginal cost i CF +α of using the credit facility. Then, the bank will use the interbank market and/or the credit facility, 0 ≤ B opt < A − K. The bank will cut borrowing in the interbank market until the marginal cost of borrowing in the interbank market equals the marginal cost of the credit facility
The case of a bank having excess liquidity K −A ≥ 0 can be interpreted along the same lines. Suppose that this bank lends its excess liquidity in the interbank market. Then, the marginal net return is equal to i IBM − γ (K − A). If this marginal net return is (weakly) higher than the marginal return i DF of using the deposit facility, the bank has no reason to use the deposit facility, and
short of i DF , the bank will cut lending in the interbank market until the marginal net return of lending equals i DF .
Lemma 1 has implications for the transaction volume B in the interbank market. 15
On the one hand, a bank is willing to borrow some amount equal to B in this market only if the marginal cost i IBM + γB of borrowing does not exceed the marginal cost i CF + α of the credit facility. On the other hand, a bank is willing to lend an amount equal to B only if the marginal net return i IBM − γB is at least as large as the marginal return i DF of the deposit facility. Both conditions imply that the transaction volume in the interbank market cannot exceed a specific amount
where B marg denotes the transaction volume, for which the marginality condition of the borrower as well as the marginality condition of the lender is met with equality.
Recall that in either state of the world, bank b faces an autonomous liquidity surplus 
After the state of the world has been realized, the surplus bank b still has excess
It will thus never demand credit in the interbank market. Based on this, Lemma 2 reveals that depending on the liquidity position of bank a, we can distinguish four scenarios, (a) to (d), when discussing the interbank market equilibrium.
In scenario (a), bank a also has excess liquidity so that it does not demand credit in the interbank market either. Accordingly, there will be no transaction in that market, to bank a, and bank a will use the credit facility to satisfy its remaining liquidity needs.
If, however, K b − A b exceeds B marg , bank b will lend B marg to bank a. Then, the credit facility as well as the deposit facility will be used. The former will be used by bank a, the latter by bank b. In this scenario, borrowers compete for obtaining liquidity. Therefore, the interbank rate will be bid up until the marginal costs of borrowing in the interbank market i IBM + γB equals the marginal cost i CF + α of using the credit facility.
In the last scenario (d), there is neither an aggregate liquidity deficit nor a surplus.
Like in the scenario before, bank b will lend either its complete excess liquidity
or an amount equal to B marg to bank a, depending on which amount is smaller. In this scenario, no bank will have the "power" to bid up or down the interbank market rate to the marginal costs of its counterparty, and we can only say that i IBM will be somewhere in the interval between i DF + γB and i CF + α − γB.
Optimal Borrowing in the MRO (First Stage) and Equilibrium
This section concentrates on the first stage of the model. At this stage, the banks choose the amount of liquidity K ≥ 0 they bid for in the MRO. They do not yet know which state of the world will occur later on. That is, when deciding upon K, the banks are uncertain whether their autonomous liquidity needs A will be small (A = A L ) or large (A = A H ).
The amount of liquidity K a bank borrows in the MRO also determines the amount of liquidity it borrows or lends in the interbank market and its usage of the facilities.
Consequntly, the decision problem of a bank reads:
where B opt L (B opt H ) denotes the bank's optimal transactions on the interbank market in case of low (high) liquidity needs. Solving this optimization problem and considering that in equilibrium, each bank's bid in the MRO must be optimal given that the implied interest rate on the interbank market in either state is consistent with these bids. Therefore, we obtain Proposition Defineγ
Suppose thatγ < γ, then, the overall equilibrium has the following properties:
(b) Ifγ < γ <γ:
(c) If γ ≥γ:
The Proposition reveals that depending on the transaction cost parameter γ three regimes can be distinguished. In regime (a) transaction costs are small (γ ≤γ), in regime 
D, by borrowing in the MRO (panel i). Consequently, in regime (a) none of the facilities is used (panel (ii) and (iv)). In regime (b) large transaction costs on the interbank market
imply that bank a prefers to borrow more in the MRO and less in the interbank market so that bank b is no longer able to place its total liquidity surplus in the interbank market and thus uses the deposit facility. Increasing transaction costs induce bank a to cover more and more of its liquidity deficit in the MRO so that bank b places more and more liquidity in the deposit facility. In regime (c) extremely large transaction costs imply that bank a will even prefer to use the credit facility instead of borrowing in the interbank 
At the same time, the expected interbank rate must be large enough to induce bank b to lend its surplus instead of using the deposit facility. That is, the expected marginal net return of lending must be (weakly) higher than the marginal return of the deposit facility (
These two requirements for E[i IBM ] result in the condition γ ≤γ for transacting bank b's total surplus in the interbank market. 16 Since in regime (a), this condition is met, bank a bids for the aggregate deficit in the MRO and expects to cover its total remaining deficit, which corresponds to bank b's total surplus, in the interbank market. However, the banks do not only expect to trade bank b's total surplus in the interbank market from an ex ante perspective. From an ex post perspective, i.e. after the state of the world has occurred, they actually do exchange the complete liquidity surplus of bank b. This is particularly crucial in state 2. In this state, bank b's actual surplus, and therefore, actual transaction costs in the interbank market, are rather large so that it might be favorable for bank a to use the credit facility instead of covering its total remaining deficit in the interbank market. Bank a refrains from doing so and borrows A a H − D from bank b via the interbank market in state 2 only if transaction costs are sufficiently small with γ ≤ γ, where the threshold γ is defined by (21) . 17 This condition is met in regime (a) since we restrict our analysis to the caseγ < γ. We will comment on this restriction at the end of this section. Note that in this regime, an increase in γ leads to a decrease in
Intuitively, higher transaction costs make the interbank market less attractive for bank a. Therefore, the expected interbank rate must decrease to offset the higher transaction costs.
Regime (b) withγ < γ <γ is characterized by relatively large transaction costs so that at the point K a = D, marginal costs of borrowing in the MRO are lower than those of using the interbank market. Therefore, it is too expensive for the banks to exchange bank b's total liquidity surplus. As a consequence, bank a expands borrowing in the MRO beyond the aggregate deficit D and bank b has to use the deposit facility. However, the credit facility is not used. To understand why, note that due to the aggregate liquidity surplus, the interbank rate will always bid down until bank b's marginal net revenue of lending is equal to the marginal revenue of the deposit facility
so that from an ex ante perspective, we have
bank a borrows in the MRO until the marginal costs equal the expected marginal cost of 16 To see this, rearrange the first requirement to
17 To see this, recall from (9) that the transaction volume in the interbank market must satisfy B ≤ 1 2 are independent of γ. Accordingly, the expected interbank rate, which equals the sum of the marginal return of the deposit facility and the marginal expected transaction costs
, does not depend on γ either. This, however, is not true for the respective interbank market rates in the two states as figure 4 indicates. When γ increases by one percent, B declines by the same absolute amount in both states. Therefore, since B * 1 < B * 2 , a one percent increase in γ decreases B * 1 (B * 2 ) by more (less) than one percent so that the interbank rate falls (raises) in state 1 (2).
In the last regime (c), in which transaction costs are extremely large with γ ≥γ, bank a will again change its behavior. Crucial is that in this regime transaction costs are even that high that in the second state of the world, in which bank a has high liquidity needs, it prefers to cover at least parts of its remaining deficit by using the credit facility. The credit facility will only be used in state 2 since the liquidity deficit that bank a faces in state 1 is certain. Independently of whether state 1 or 2 occurs, bank a has at least liquidity needs equal to A a L (see Table 1 ), and it is obviously less costly to cover certain liquidity needs by borrowing in the MRO than by using the credit facility. Therefore, in regime (c), bank a borrows in the MRO until the marginal costs i MRO + α of the MRO satisfy:
where the first term on the RHS reflects the marginal costs in the interbank market in state 1 and the second term reflects the marginal costs of the credit facility in state 2.
Like in regime (b), there will be an aggregate liquidity surplus so that we have i IBM
Together with (22), this leads to the optimal K a . Relative to a scenario without a credit facility (see the respective dashed line in figure 4) , the bank will thus bid less in the MRO. This is because the existence of the credit facility makes the MRO relatively less attractive. Due to the smaller amount obtained in the MRO, bank a will borrow more from bank b in state 1, so that there is less usage of the deposit facility in this state compared to a situation without credit facility. In state 2, however, bank b puts even more liquidity in the deposit facility.
Implications
Explanation of the Stylized Facts
In section 3 we identified the following four stylized facts for the second phase of the financial crisis, i.e. after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. (1) A strong increase in the banking sector's demand for reserves in the Eurosystem's tender procedures, (2) a strong increase in the use of the Eurosystem's deposit facility, whereas the use of the marginal lending facility did not increase significantly, (3) a strong decrease in transactions on the interbank market for reserves, and (4) a systematic fall of the EONIA below the MROrate. These stylized facts correspond exactly with our model results described by regime (b) in section 4.3. Therefore, we argue that the financial crisis, especially after the collapse of Lehman Brothers implied a strong increase in transaction costs on the interbank market for reserves. The reason is that the financial crisis led to severe bank-asset losses combined with a high degree of uncertainty in how far and to what extent individual banks were affected by these losses. This implied that it became more difficult to find suitable counterparties on the interbank market. The increased transaction costs in the interbank market implied that for deficit banks it became more attractive to cover their liquidity needs by participating in the Eurosystem's fixed rate tender procedures than by borrowing in the interbank market. As a consequence, the demand for reserves in the tender procedures increased significantly. The increased demand was totally satisfied by the Eurosystem. This implied that transactions in the interbank market fell significantly and that the amount of outstanding central bank credits to the banking sector exceeded by far the banking sector's liquidity needs resulting from the minimum reserve requirements and the autonomous factors. Consequently, at the aggregate level, there was excess liquidity in the banking sector which meant for the surplus banks that they had to place liquidity in the Eurosystem's deposit facility and that the EONIA fell below the fixed MRO-rate near to its lower bound which is the rate on the deposit facility.
There are two aspects which need some attention. Firstly, according to our model, the strong use of the deposit facility in the second phase of the financial crisis is not the result of precautionary motives. If banks held central bank balances because of precautionary motives, they would cover uncertain liquidity needs by borrowing in the Eurosystem's tender procedures. However, as long as the probability of high liquidity needs is not sufficiently higher than the probability of low liquidity needs (in our model these probabilities are assumed to be the same), this behaviour is not rational. Borrowing in the tender procedures and hording the liquidity in the deposit facility as a precaution is more expensive than using the credit facility if necessary. According to our model, the strong usage of the deposit facility is due to the fact that for deficit banks it is more attractive to borrow from the central bank than in the interbank market which implies that surplus banks are not able to place their excess liquidity at adequate conditions in the interbank market. For them too, transacting with the central bank is the more attractive alternative. This leads us to the second aspect. Since surplus banks place excess liquidity at the Eurosystem and deficit banks borrow liquidity directly from the Eurosystem, the Eurosystem assumed the function as an intermediary between banks and thereby replaced a bulk of interbank market activities.
Policy Implications
The financial crisis has posed extraordinary challenges to the Eurosystem with regard to its monetary policy as well as with regard to its liquidity management. The primary objective of its monetary policy is to maintain price stability, and if it is possible without prejudicing this objective, the Eurosystem is allowed to support the general economic policy of the EU which shall promote, for example, a high level of employment (Treaty establishing the European Community, Article 105). The Eurosystem's liquidity management shall ensure that the monetary policy transmission mechanism works properly and that in a financial crisis possible liquidity problems do not result in solvency problems (González-Páramo, 2009 ). The latter makes clear that during a financial crisis one objective of the Eurosystem's liquidity management is to support the stabilization of the banking sector. This paper focuses on the Eurosystem's liquidity management. We argue that in the financial crisis significantly increased transaction costs impaired a proper functioning of the interbank market for reserves. An impaired functioning of this market impedes the transmission of monetary policy impulses and may furthermore imply that liquidity problems result in solvency problems. Therefore, the Eurosystem replaced the interbank market by assuming the function as an intermediary between banks. However, this is only a temporary solution, the aim is to reduce this intermediary function and to reactivate the interbank market.
The obvious way to achieve this goal is to reduce transaction costs. However, the high transaction costs on the interbank market for reserves are the result of a high uncertainty about how strongly individual banks are affected by asset losses. Consequently, a reduction in transaction costs cannot be achieved by central bank measures. A possibility for the Eurosystem to reactivate the interbank market is to no longer satisfy total bids in the tender procedure but to allot only the benchmark amount. A further possibility is to make borrowing from the central bank and placing liquidity in the deposit facility less attractive, for example by tightening the criteria which have to be fulfilled by eligible collateral or by expanding the corridor the rates on the deposit and the credit facility perform around the MRO-rate. In our model, this would result in an increase in the parameter α and a decrease in i DF respectively, and the results given by regime b in the Proposition reveal that this would lead to an increase in B * , i.e. transaction in the interbank market would increase. However, such measures have to be balanced against liquidity problems which may arise and against higher costs for the banking sector. Consequently, the Eurosystem faces a trade-off. On the one hand, it aims at reactivating interbank market activities, on the other hand it aims at supporting the stabilization of the banking sector and the general economic policy of the EU. Therefore, we propose to undertake these measures gradually over time. Over time the uncertainty should decrease so that transaction costs become lower again so that the intermediation function becomes less important.
Summary
After the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, there was (1) a strong increase in the banking sector's demand for reserves in the Eurosystem's tender procedures, (2) a strong increase in the use of the Eurosystem's deposit facility, (3) a strong decrease in interbank market transactions, and (4) a systematic fall of the EONIA below the key ECB policy rate. In this paper, we theoretically explain these stylized facts and draw policy implications concerning the Eurosystem's liquidity management. Our model shows that the stylized facts can be explained by a strong increase in transaction costs on the interbank market in combination with the possibility of a nearly unlimited use of central bank credit. The increased transaction costs imply that banks having a liquidity deficit prefer to cover their deficit by borrowing from the central bank rather than in the interbank market. This induces banks with a liquidity surplus to place their excess liquidity in the central bank's deposit facility. Thus, the central bank assumes an intermediary function between banks. The result is an aggregate liquidity surplus in the banking sector which implies a systematic fall of the EONIA below the policy rate. Concerning the implications for the Eurosystem's liquidity management we argue that as long as the interbank market does not function properly, measures to reactivate the interbank market conflict with aims from the monetary policy perspective and the financial stability perspective. Therefore, we propose to undertake these measures gradually over time.
Appendix Proof of Lemma 1
Substitution of (4) and (5) in (6) and taking the first derivative of f (B) with respect to B yields
As
∂B is increasing in B, we need to distinguish three cases: Firstly, if the limit of
∂f(B) ∂B
as B tends to A − K from below satisfies lim (23) that the optimal transaction B opt in the interbank market is implicitly defined by i IBM + γB opt − (i CF + α) = 0, so that we obtain
Secondly, if the limit of
∂B as B tends to A − K from above satisfies lim 
and (26) directly result in (7) and (8).
Proof of Lemma 2
We proof the lemma in two steps.
This condition is met only if i IBM = i DF ; substitution of this in (8) gives B = 0 (see (10) and (11) in lemma 2). Secondly, if A a − K a > 0 (and K b − A b ≥ 0), substitution of (7) and (8) in the market clearing condition B a opt + B b opt = 0 gives
Now, we can distinguish three subcases:
, the LHS of (27) is smaller than 0. Accordingly, we can restrict attention to
This condition is met if i IBM = i DF + γ min {A a − K a , B marg }; substitution of this in (7) or (8) gives B = min {A a − K a , B marg } (see (12) and (13) in lemma 2). As the LHS of (28) is strictly decreasing in i IBM , this equilibrium is unique.
• Secondly, suppose that
and thus min A a − K a , (27) is bigger than 0. Accordingly, we can restrict attention to
This condition is met if see (14) and (15) in lemma 2).
As the LHS of (29) is strictly decreasing in i IBM , this equilibrium is unique.
• Thirdly, suppose that
By parallel arguments as above, it can be shown that in this case, (27) is met only if
of this in (7) or (8) 
Proof of the proposition
Substitution of (1), (4) and (5) in (18), together with lemma 1, gives
For a given liquidity need A i with i = L, H, it follows from (7) that if A i − K > 0, we have:
while it follows from (8) that if A i − K ≤ 0, we have:
Substitution of (31) and (32) in (30) gives As i CF + 2α > i CF + α, this condition is never met. Therefore, we can conclude that there is no equilibrium in which bank a makes a bid K a * ≥ A a L in equilibrium.
• Secondly, it follows from (33) that an equilibrium with K a * < A a L and K b * > 0 is feasible only if 
From the perspective of bank a, it follows from (30) that K a * < D can be an equilibrium only if
Due to (37) and (38), this condition can be modified to
This condition is never met. Therefore, we can conclude that there is no equilibrium with K a * < D and K b * = 0.
• Secondly, consider an equilibrium with Due to (39) and (40), this condition can be rearranged to
and thus 
From the perspective of bank a, it follows from (30) that K a * > D can be an equilibrium only if
Substitution of (37) and (38) 
